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With the sudden explosion of movements for democratic change across the Arab world at the beginning of 2011, many scholars and advocates of democracy began to speak excitedly of a “fourth 
wave” of democratic expansion.  But within a few months, it became apparent that 
the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt would not be repeated so easily elsewhere in 
the Arab world; that democracy remained a highly uncertain destination in each 
of these countries, particularly Egypt, in the near term; and that Arab autocracies 
were falling back on proven mixes of repression, cooptation, and limited 
or illusory “reform” in order to hang on.  The fall in 2011 of three seemingly 
unassailable Arab autocrats—Zine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar 
Qaddhaffi—and the serious challenges to authoritarian rule in Yemen, Bahrain, 
and Syria, as well as the lesser but gathering opposition pressure in such other 
countries as Morocco and Jordan, are undeniable signs of the continued salience 
and attraction of the democratic ideal.  Over time, they are likely to lead to at least 
some new democracies in the Arab world.  But this prospect of a new burst of 
democratic change raises a more global question:  What has become of the third 
wave of democracy?  And what shapes the successes and failures of democracy?
The period of global politics since 1974, which Samuel P. Huntington 
labeled the “third wave” of global democratization, has seen the most sweeping 
transformation in the way that states are governed in the history of human 
civilization.  During this period, democracy (meaning a political system in which 
people can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, fair, and meaningful 
elections) has gone from being a preserve of the West and a few odd developing 
countries to a truly global phenomenon, the most common form of government 
in the world and the type of political system that the majority of human beings on 
earth live in.  The percentage of states that are democracies increased from just 
slightly more than a quarter in 1973 to a third in 1980, about half in 1992, and 
then 60 percent in the year 2000.  The expansion of democracy reached its high 
water mark in 2006, with 121 democracies, nearly 63 percent of all states.  During 
this period democracy became the only broadly legitimate form of government in 
the world, the predominant form of government in several regions of the world, 
and a viable option in every region of the world except the Middle East.  Among 
major cultural zones, only the Arab world lacked a single democracy.
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Latin America has gone from a region of scarce or chronically unstable 
democracy before the third wave to one where democracy is the predominant 
and expected form of government.  There has been some worrisome erosion and 
stagnation.  But for the first time ever, democracy has deepened and become 
consolidated in Latin America’s largest country, Brazil, which less than two 
decades ago looked like it was mired in dysfunctional political institutions and 
recurrent economic crisis. And Chile has become one of the most liberal and 
durable democracies in what used to be called the “developing world,” and an 
economic success story. 
The fate of democracy totters some as one moves north from Latin America’s 
Southern Cone.  Since winning the presidential election in 1999, Venezuela’s 
populist president, Hugo Chavez—who twice tried to seize power earlier in 
military coups—has gradually suffocated political pluralism and destroyed 
the independence and integrity of democratic institutions to the point where 
Venezuela ceased to be a democracy a number of years ago.  To some extent, left-
wing populist presidents in Bolivia and Ecuador, and more recently Nicaragua 
with the return to power of the Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega, have done the 
same thing, mobilizing economic and social resentments to challenge democratic 
constitutional norms and restraints.  It is an open question whether any of these 
three countries can still be called a democracy.  But none of these leaders has 
succeeded in squelching the democratic process to the extent that Chavez has 
done and Chavez himself is under growing pressure of popular protest against 
his excesses. If democracy has become more stressed and unsettled in Central 
America and Mexico because of intensifying criminal violence due to the drug 
trade, at least there is no alternative to democracy being put forward.  In Latin 
America, only Cuba rejects the model of electoral democracy altogether, and 
increasingly the society is deeply at odds with its regime there.
With the end of the Cold War and then the expansion of the European Union, 
Europe has become whole and democratic as never before in its long history 
of bloody conflict.  All ten of the Central and East European countries that 
were admitted to the European Union between 2004 and 2007 have become 
consolidated and for the most part liberal democracies, though corruption and 
a weak rule of law remain serious challenges in a few countries, particularly 
Romania and Bulgaria. The completion of this vision of a Europe united by 
democratic values and institutions and by economic and social integration still 
confronts many challenges.  The most urgent and profound one is the growing 
fiscal disarray of the Euro Zone, as evidenced most dramatically in the debt crises 
that has torn apart Greece and threatens to engulf a number of other southern 
European countries.  In addition, democrats in Romania and Bulgaria have been 
discouraged by the persistence and in some respects resurgence of illiberal and 
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corrupt political practices now that the “heat” of EU conditionality is long since 
off with the completion of the accession agreements.  Yet, from the standpoint of 
democracy, these problems pale in comparison to the situation Europe faced on 
the eve of the third wave, when Greece was under a military dictatorship, Spain 
and Portugal were still ruled by long-term autocracies, and all of Central and 
Eastern Europe was behind the Iron Curtain of communist and ultimately Soviet 
domination.
The picture is bleaker in the 12 states of the former Soviet Union outside the 
Baltics.  In most of these countries, including Russia, authoritarian rule seems 
firmly entrenched.  Ukraine and Moldova are the only democracies, and since 
the pro-democracy forces imploded in the 2009 presidential election, Ukraine 
has been slipping back in terms of press freedom and the extent and health of 
democracy.  Yet, since popular protests forced out the autocratic government 
in April 2010, Kyrgyzsgtan has moved back toward democracy.  And political 
pluralism (if not quite democracy) remains alive in Georgia.
During the third wave, East Asia has gone from being the cradle and locus 
of “developmental authoritarianism,” with Japan being the lone democracy—
and a longstanding one-party dominant system at that—to at least a mixed and 
progressing set of systems. Japan, Taiwan and Korea now all stand as liberal and 
consolidated democracies.  They are hardly free of deep governance problems 
and serious citizen disenchantment, but that is true of the US many European 
democracies as well. Mongolia is also a fairly liberal democracy by the scores 
of Freedom House, and democracy also seems well established in Indonesia and 
(once again) the Philippines.  But these countries, along with Thailand and East 
Timor, struggle with serious problems of rule of law, and Thailand suffers as well 
from crippling levels of political polarization.  
Democratic pressures are clearly growing in Singapore and Malaysia as 
modernization proceeds (with Singapore being the richest non-democracy in per 
capita income in the history of the world).  In May 2011, the long ruling party 
won its lowest percentage of the votes (60 percent) since becoming the dominant 
party from the start of Singapore’s independence. In Malaysia, opposition 
political forces have made significant electoral inroads in recent years.  The new 
opposition alliance, Pakatan Rakyat, is gaining momentum, and a transition to 
democracy could happen in Malaysia any time in the coming years, through the 
familiar instrument that has brought it in other competitive authoritarian regimes: 
the electoral process.
To be sure, authoritarianism is still well entrenched in six of the seventeen 
countries in Southeast Asia:  China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and 
North Korea.  But cracks are appearing in the edifice of many of these regimes 
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as well, under the pressures of rapid modernization in China and of deepening 
development failure in North Korea.
Long a region of democratic vibrancy, South Asia has experienced considerable 
oscillation during the third wave, in part because of Pakistan’s repeated democratic 
failures and now protracted descent into state decay as a result of extremist 
mobilization, military domination, and the incurable corruption and fecklessness 
of the civilian political parties and politicians.  Another sad story has been the 
steady decay of Sri Lanka from a stable democracy to a highly illiberal one, 
ravaged by civil war, finally to a highly corrupt and abusive electoral autocracy. 
However, democracy remains sturdy and vibrant in India, and Bangladesh has 
once again returned to democracy after a brief interruption. 
After Eastern Europe, the region that enjoyed the biggest democracy surge 
after the end of the Cold War was Sub-Saharan Africa.  When the third wave 
began, there were only three democracies in Africa, and in very small countries: 
Botswana, Mauritius, and Gambia. Once the Cold War ended and African states 
were no longer pawns, to be wooed with aid and arms in a struggle between 
great powers, democracy flowered.   By the middle of the first decade of this new 
century, about half of Africa’s 48 states were democracies.  No development in 
modern history so challenged the social science theory of structural pre-requisites 
for democracy, like economic development, widespread literacy, and a strong 
middle class.  Moreover, by this point, many of the democracies in Africa, Asia 
and elsewhere were countries with Muslim majorities, like Turkey, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal, and Niger.
The only region left untouched by this grand historical process of global 
democratization has been the Middle East—until this year.  There were many 
Muslim-majority countries with significant democratic experience, but—except 
for Turkey—not in the Middle East.  Until an outraged street vendor, Mohammed 
Bouazizi, fed up with years of petty predation and humiliation by the state, set 
himself aflame on December 17, 2010, thereby igniting the Tunisian revolution, 
the stirrings of democratic protest and limited reform in the region seemed to 
be leading nowhere.  Now, there is at least a prospect of democratic change in a 
few Arab countries, and no Arab authoritarian regime feels as secure as it did in 
November 2010.  
It is not difficult to draw additional hope and inspiration about the future of 
democracy in the world from these other facts: 
•  About three of every five states in the world are now at least electoral 
democracies.
•  About two-thirds of the world’s democracies (77) are reasonably high-
quality or “liberal” democracies, in the sense that electoral competition 
is institutionalized, fair, and open, civil liberties are better protected, 
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and there are low levels of political violence and abuses or impunity by 
state security services.  
•  Democracy has become consolidated or at least endures in most of the 
important emerging market countries that have become members of the 
G20:  India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey 
and South Africa; only China and Saudi Arabia among this group are 
authoritarian.
•  There is still no other type of political system in the world that represents 
anything approaching a rival model, despite the supposed growing 
attraction of China’s authoritarian development “miracle”.
•  The United Nations and a variety of regional organizations have become 
more explicitly supportive of democracy as a universal value.  
•  Annual spending to promote democracy internationally has grown 
significantly beyond the early considerable efforts of first Germany 
(with its party foundations) and then the United States, with the 
UNDP and many bilateral aid programs of Europe, North America and 
Australia spending significant proportions of their overall budgets to 
monitor and support free and fair elections, assist democratic political 
parties and civil society organizations, fight corruption, enhance 
independent media, and strengthen the rule of law and other processes 
and institutions of “good governance.”
• The Community of Democracies has gained considerable depth and 
momentum in the last few years, and will celebrate and consolidate its 
recent progress here in Ulan Bataar in April of next year.
Five Years of Democratic Recession
 
That is the largely good news, but unfortunately it is not the whole news. 
For the past five years at least, the world has experienced a marked democratic 
recession.  This is indicated by several statistics.  First, the number of democracies 
has been declining in the last several years.  By my count, the number of electoral 
democracies has declined from a peak of 121 in 2006 to 116 in 2011 (though 
this does represent a slight increase from the previous year).  Second, there 
has been a rising tide of breakdowns of democracy. Nearly a third of all the 
democracies that have existed during the third wave have broken down (with 
some countries like Thailand and Nigeria experiencing repeated breakdowns). 
And the pace of breakdowns has accelerated since the 1999 coup that toppled 
the civilian democracy in Pakistan.  If we divide the 38 years of the third wave 
into three roughly equal periods of about a dozen years, we find that 16 percent 
of the existing democracies broke down between 1974 and 1985, less than 12 
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percent between 1986 and 1998, but nearly 20 percent between 1999 and 2011. 
Moreover, of the 54 breakdowns or reversals of democracy that have occurred 
since the third wave began in 1974, roughly half of them have occurred since 
1999. And 16 of these have taken place just in the past six years.
 During the past six years, freedom levels have steadily declined.  The 
years 2006 through 2010 have been the longest period of decline in freedom 
since the great burst of democratic expansion after the Cold War ended.  In each 
of these years, more countries declined than improved in their Freedom House 
ratings of political rights and civil liberties, and the deterioration was particularly 
marked in the years 2007 through 2011, when in each year more than twice as 
many countries declined as improved in their freedom levels.
Of course, the declines in democracy and in freedom are related.  First, 
obviously, when democracy is lost, freedom levels decline.  But, particularly 
since 1990, democracy has generally broken down where it has been of lower 
quality. Generally, breakdowns have occurred in illiberal democracies, and often 
in extremely illiberal ones. The factors underlying low democratic quality—
most typically, extensive corruption, abuse of power, and a weak rule of law, 
often accompanied by significant levels of violence and violations of rights—
are also the factors that incline democracies to breakdown.  Weak and illiberal 
states provide a poor foundation for democracy. There is a significant correlation 
between the quality of democracy and the political stability, legitimacy, and 
progress toward consolidation of democracy.  
There is another sobering aspect to the state of democracy in the world.  A 
number of the countries that Freedom House classifies as electoral democracies 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way insist (in their recent book, Competitive 
Authoritarianism) should be removed from the list because elections are so unfair, 
or the political playing field is so uneven, or civil liberties are so constrained, 
that the system is really better understood as “competitive authoritarian.”  By a 
rigorous application of these more demanding standards for electoral democracy, 
the real number of democracies in the world might be little more than 100, closer 
to half of the states of the world.
Worries about the resilience of the third wave of democracy arise from less 
tangible or measurable factors as well.  With China’s continuing economic 
boom has come a rising prestige and growing projection of its economic power. 
There is growing fascination in some quarters with the “China model,” which 
(it is argued) can cut through the tedious delays and coalitional demands of 
democratic politics and simply make economic decisions, budgetary allocations, 
and infrastructural investments based on what will yield the greatest and most 
rapid national gains in development.  It is hard to argue with success, and neo-
Communist China is.  But China also struggles with some very big developmental 
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problems and contradictions, and the bigger story that is starting to gain notice is 
the continuing shift in the locus of global economic growth and energy away from 
the advanced industrial democracies toward the emerging market economies—
mostly democracies—like those that have recently joined the G20. For every 
emerging authoritarian developmental success story in the world today, there are 
more cases of authoritarian stagnation or democratic progress.  
Two other negative trends cast a certain shadow over current global democratic 
prospects.  One is the backlash against civil society and international democracy 
assistance that has been building for the past six to seven years.  Particularly 
since the color revolutions, authoritarian regimes like those in Russia, Belarus, 
China, Iran and throughout Central Asia have taken careful note of the positive 
contribution that international democracy assistance (including grants to civil 
society organizations and election monitoring) have made to democratic advances 
and breakthroughs.  Consequently, they have sought to frustrate, close off, and 
even criminalize these flows. Some African autocracies like Ethiopia and Sudan 
have eagerly jumped on the bandwagon of this backlash and appear to have (at 
least for now) consolidated or entrenched their authoritarian rule as a result.  
Why Democracies Have Failed During the Third Wave
What has consistently plagued the failed and failing democracies of the third 
wave has been bad governance.  What makes these democracies vulnerable is not 
poverty per se but several other conditions that are much harder to surmount at 
lower levels of economic development: rampant corruption, low state capacity 
and efficiency, weak rule of law, crime and insecurity, political and ethnic 
violence, and political polarization.  It is not that middle-income (and even some 
upper-income countries) do not struggle with these problems, but the quality of 
governance simply tends to be poorer in lower-income countries, and this in itself 
makes democracy more vulnerable.  And in addition, other dimensions of the 
quality of democracy, such as participation, civil society, and the fairness and 
transparency of elections themselves, also tend to be weaker in lower-income 
countries.  Thus, this is where the disproportionate share of the democratic 
erosion has been during the third wave, and this is where the greatest challenge 
of deepening and consolidating democracy lies—though it should be noted that 
democracy has persisted for more than a decade or even two in a surprising 
number of lower-income countries in Africa and Asia.
Most of the democracies that have broken down in the past decade or so were 
in the bottom third of the distribution on most of the six World Bank indicators 
of the quality of governance around the time their democracy was overthrown or 
strangled by executive abuse.  
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The troubled and failed democracies of recent times have shared a few key 
characteristics.  First, they tend (with a few exceptions like Russia, Venezuela, 
and Thailand) to be poor or lower-middle-income, with per capita incomes (in 
purchasing power parity dollars) under $5,000. Second, they are poorly governed. 
Not only do they have weak rule of law and rampant corruption, but their 
governments are not very effective in terms of the quality and independence of the 
civil service, and of public services and policy formulation and implementation 
more generally. Third, they are politically unstable, with significant levels of 
politically motivated violence.  Fourth, they are deeply polarized on class, ethnic, 
or other lines of cleavage (sometimes, as in Bangladesh, deeply rooted in enmity 
between parties), which is one reason why they suffer civil wars and high levels 
of political violence.  Fifth, executive power is seriously abused.  
Executive abuse of power has been in the key factor in the demise of democracy 
in places like Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, the Philippines, Georgia, Honduras, 
Niger, and Nicaragua, and it certainly played a role in others like Pakistan and 
Kenya. By contrast, “effective constraints on executive power substantially 
increase the chances that democracy will survive” in post-transition and fragile 
circumstances.1 
Interestingly, crises of imploding economic growth or spiraling unemployment 
have figured less prominently in the failure of democracy in the last two decades. 
Certainly, economic and social injustice forms the backdrop for the crises of social 
and political polarization that have been gathering in Latin America for quite some 
time.  But the world’s fragile democracies are mostly poor countries that are not 
well integrated into world markets.  It is too early to dismiss the global economic 
downturn as a factor that could undermine the stability of democracies, but at 
most its effects seem likely to be secondary, reinforcing other negative trends. 
Grounds for Hope, Sources of Resilience
While there are grounds for serious concern about the global state of 
democracy, there are also sound bases for judicious optimism.  If there is 
restlessness with democracy in many places, there is generally greater unease if 
not disgust with authoritarian rule—as has been witnessed in a number of Arab 
countries in the past eighteen months.  The Arab Spring protests have shown 
the underlying insecurity and fragility of the world’s remaining authoritarian 
regimes.  No less, they affirm that the desire to live in dignity, with freedom and 
political choice, is as nearly universal a political value as we have in our time. In 
fact, public opinion surveys show overwhelming proportions of Arabs preferring 
a democratic system.  In other regions, majorities of the public in most countries 
continue to believe that democracy is the best form of government, or at least 
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that all other known forms are worse.  Even where (as in much of East Asia and 
Central and Eastern Europe) citizens have a low opinion of parties, politicians, 
and parliaments, they do not prefer to live under authoritarianism in general nor 
under any concrete authoritarian options that they can imagine.  
For all of democracy’s troubles in the past decade or so, there has still been 
no “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns on anything like the scale of what 
ended the first and second waves of global democratization during the 1920s and 
30s (preceding but accelerating with the Great Depression) and then again during 
the 1958-75 heyday of military coups and socialist or developmental autocracies. 
This is all the more remarkable given that the world has been living through the 
worst period of economic turmoil and downturn since the Great Depression.  So 
far, third wave democracies have mainly responded to economic crisis and pain 
by replacing incumbent governments at the ballot box, rather than by replacing 
democratic regimes.  Moreover, economic contraction does not seem to have been 
a significant cause of democratic breakdowns in the last decade or so. Generally, 
those democracies that were extinguished as a result of the mounting executive 
abuses of power were experiencing robust economic growth at the time. This was 
particularly true of the oil countries, but the same was true to a lesser extent of 
the Philippines and Kenya.  In the case of the oil countries, it is even plausible 
that the booming oil economies added to the incentive to strangle democracy. To 
be sure, it is hard to locate the demise of democracy precisely in time when it is 
due to a gradual process of decay rather than a discrete event like a coup, but the 
pattern is striking.  
The surprising story of many third wave countries has been the resilience 
of democratic politics in the face of sometimes severe economic downturns. I 
stress “politics” because it appears to be the normalization of electoral politics 
that spared these democracies the fate of many new and vulnerable democracies 
during the 1920s and 30s.  In the past few years, stressed and unhappy voters have 
thrown out incumbents, not democracy itself.  “In most cases where economic 
downturns were severe, with the growth rate in the election year plummeting 
by at lest seven percentage points (as happened in Bulgaria, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Panama, and Ukraine), incumbents took a beating.”  Where the downturn was less 
severe, incumbents had a much better chance of surviving (about 50 percent).  “In 
general, democratic elections have performed as intended in times of economic 
distress, providing a safety valve that allows voters to punish incumbents while 
preserving the system as a whole.”2
And it remains the case that above a certain upper-middle threshold of per 
capita income, roughly $10,000 in 2009 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars, 
there is virtually no instance of a democracy breaking down. About 25 third-wave 
democracies (not just Taiwan, Korea, and the new EU entrants but Turkey, Brazil 
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and South Africa as well) are now above that minimum threshold. In short, the 
universe of stable and consolidated or relatively secure democracies seems to 
have expanded significantly.
The Future of Democracy
  With the economic and political woes of Europe, Japan, and the United 
States these days, there is beginning to emerge a new rhetoric of skepticism if 
not outright pessimism about the capacity of democratic institutions to solve the 
fundamental problems of aging populations and physical infrastructure, spiraling 
debt burdens, and declining economic competitiveness.  The moment is not unlike 
the mid-1970s, when the Trilateral Commission produced its famous report on 
“The Crisis of Democracy” (the focus of which was heavily on “governability.”) 
Wealth and power are shifting away from Europe and North America to the 
developing regions.  Polls show that people in these regions want democracy 
not so much because it is the political formula of “the West”, but because it 
provides basic political goods—political freedom, voice, accountability, popular 
sovereignty, and a rule of law—that authoritarian regimes cannot.  So long as 
democracy can indeed provide these political goods, and reasonable progress in 
economic development as well, it will continue to be valued and embraced, even 
if its performance in the “West” continues to disappoint.
 One flaw in the pessimistic line of analysis is the assumption that while 
Europe and the U.S. will thrash about in political frustration and economic 
decline, China will continue to boom, with the Communist Party in the driver’s 
seat.  This assumption is deeply flawed for two reasons.  First, China is facing its 
own looming developmental challenges, in the form of an overheated real estate 
market, a potentially vulnerable banking sector, a looming severe labor shortage, 
and massive unaddressed environmental stresses.  It is unlikely that China can 
continue for much longer the torrid pace of 8 to 10 percent economic growth that 
it has sustained for the past two decades.  It is not yet clear how (or how well) 
the Communist Party will manage the frustrations of slowed growth, and the 
vulnerabilities cited above. In its current per capita GNP, China has already long 
since entered the famous “political zone of transition” that Samuel P. Huntington 
identified in his book, The Third Wave, as the likeliest developmental zone for 
democratic transitions.  Within a decade or two at most, it will have the per capita 
GNP level that South Korea had in 1987.  When China has as large a middle 
class, in proportional terms, as South Korea had in 1987—and with increasing 
access to the Internet and social media—will its people continue to accept the 
unaccountable one-party hegemony of Communist rule? Through incremental 
political reform or through another eruption of mass protest from below, China is 
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headed for a hge political transformation in the next generation.  Democracy is not 
the inevitable outcome, but it will inevitably be widely demanded. In fact, there 
is a much greater prospect that China will become a democracy than that India, 
Brazil or South Korea will cease to be a democracy, much less that democracy in 
Europe or the United States will somehow fall apart.
 The current moment is a difficult one for democracy.  In the past five 
years, the momentum has clearly swung in favor of authoritarian retrenchment. 
That may continue for a few more years, or longer and deeper if the democracies 
lose their vision, commitment, and capacity to continue fostering and encouraging 
democracy globally.  However, the long-term prospects for democracy remain 
encouraging.  The mobilization of Arab societies for democratic change will 
not cease any time soon, and eventually some of them will get it.  Even if 
some Arab countries enter the political cul-de-sac of Islamist authoritarianism, 
that regime form will eventually grow discredited the way it has in Iran.  The 
inspiration for left populism in Latin America, the “Bolivarian” revolution in 
Venezuela, is collapsing.  Indeed, the only thing that is sustaining authoritarian 
rule in Iran and Venezuela, and in Russia and much of the Middle East for that 
matter, is oil.  Sooner or later, their contradictions will swallow them.  For all 
their sluggishness and sleaziness, democracies retain one massive advantage over 
authoritarian regimes: The capacity for self-correction, and thus the flexibility 
to adapt rather than snap and break.  Anyone who wants to wager on the 
comparative viability of regimes in the world would be wise to bet on democracy. 
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